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Abstract - New application layer DDoS attacks is a continuous critical threat to which network layer solutions is not applicable as
attackers are indistinguishable based on packets or protocols. The increase in Internet-based transactions and communications offers
new opportunities for hackers to disrupt business operations with DDoS attacks to prevent legitimate users from accessing services.
In this paper, we propose Trust Management Helmet (TMH) as a partial solution to this problem, which is a lightweight mitigation
mechanism that uses trust to differentiate legitimate users and attackers. Its key insight is that to protecting the connectivity of good
users during application layer DDoS attacks, evaluation is based on their visiting history, and used to schedule the service to their
requests. This paper introduces a license, for user identification (even beyond NATs) and storing the trust information at clients. The
license is cryptographically secured against forgery or replay attacks. This mitigation mechanism and implement it as a Java package
and use it for simulation. Through simulation, we show that TMH is effective in mitigating session flooding attack.
Keywords - DDoS Attacks, TMH, Lightweight, Application layer.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack refers
to the attempt to prevent a server from offering services
to its legitimate users, typically by sending requests to
exhaust the server's resources, e.g. bandwidth or
processing power. DDoS attack, which makes a server
suffer in having slow responses to clients or even
refusing their accesses, may be exploited by one's
business competitors expecting to gain an edge in the
market or political enemies trying to stir chaos. Since
more and more efficient DDoS defense mechanisms and
tools are proposed and in-stalled on routers and
firewalls, the traditional network layer DDoS attacks,
such as SYN flooding, ping of death, Smurf, etc, are
much easier to be detected and defended against.
Nowadays, they are giving way to sophisticated
application layer attacks [15]. Application layer DDoS
attack is a DDoS attack that sends out requests
following the communication protocol and thus these
requests are indistinguishable from legitimate requests
in the network layer. Most application layer protocols,
for example, HTTP1.0/1.1, FTP and SOAP, are built on
TCP and they communicate with users using sessions
which consist of one or many requests. An application
layer DDoS attack may be of one or a combination of
the following types[15, 24]: (1) session flooding attack

sends session connection requests at a rate higher than
legitimate users; (2) request flooding attack sends
sessions that contain more requests than normal
sessions; and (3) asymmetric attack sends sessions with
more high-workload requests. In this paper, we focus on
how to mitigate the session flooding attack.
Constrained by the bandwidth and processing
power, application layer servers will set a threshold for
the maximum number of simultaneously connected
sessions to guarantee the quality of services. Under
session flooding attack, a defense mechanism is needed
by the server to reject attackers and to allocate the
available sessions to legitimate users. The fraction of
the rejection of requests from legitimate users over the
total number of requests from legitimate users is called
the False Rejection Rate (FRR), similarly, False
Acceptance Rate (FAR) can be defined. Although a
DDoS defense mechanism should reduce both FRR and
FAR, reducing FRR is more important for the sake of
user experience. That is, a server would rather
maximally accommodate the legitimate user sessions,
even if a small number of attacker sessions are not
detected. Furthermore, the defense mechanism must be
lightweight, to prevent itself from being the target of
DDoS attacks. It is also preferred that the defense
mechanism is independent of the details of the services,

Special Issue of International Journal of Computer Science & Informatics (IJCSI), ISSN (PRINT) : 2231–5292, Vol.- II, Issue-1, 2

International Journal of Computer Science & Informatics (IJCSI), ISSN (PRINT) : 2231–5292, Vol.- 3, Issue- 1
173
34

Mechanism to Mitigate Application Layer DDoS Attack with a Light Weight Trust approach

as then it can be deployed at any server without
modification.

[4] provided a protocol on top of Gnutella to estimate
the trustworthiness of a node. M. Srivatsa et al. [16]
identified three vulnerabilities of decentralized
reputation management and proposed TrustGuard that
let reputation grow slowly but drop quickly. In this
paper, we apply trust management to defend against
application layer DDoS attacks.

In this paper, we propose a lightweight mechanism,
named Trust Management Helmet (TMH), that uses
trust management to mitigate session flooding DDoS
attack. For every established connection it records four
aspects of trust to the user: short-term trust, long-term
trust, negative trust and misusing trust which are used to
compute an overall trust that helps in determining
whether to accept a client's next connection request.
These values are stored as part of a license at clients and
when a client revisits the server, he attaches his license
to the session connection request. Based on the license,
TMH computes the client's overall trust, updates his
license, and decides whether to accept his request. The
license is designed such that the server can easily
identify the client and verify his associated trusts, but
license forgery or replay is computationally infeasifible.
We also extend TMH to collaborative trust management
among multiple servers. Our mechanism is independent
from services deployed on servers and is portable1. We
have implemented it as a Java package and it can run
separately and then redirect scheduled requests to
servers protected or be integrated with other opensource application layer servers after slight
modification. As far as we know, our work is the first in
applying trust management to application layer DDoS
defense.

II. LEGITIMATE
MODEL

USER

AND

ATTACKER

In this section, we build the legitimate user model,
and the attacker model with several attack strategies of
different complexity. Firstly, we would like to make
two assumptions about the server.
Assumption 1 Under session flooding attacks, the
bottleneck of a server is the maximal number of
simultaneous
session
connections,
called
as
MaxConnector. It depends not only on the bandwidth of
the server, but also on other resources of the server, e.g.
CPU, memory, maximal database connections.
Assumption 2 Without attacks, the total number of
session connections of the server should be much
smaller than MaxConnector, e.g., smaller than 20% of
MaxConnector, as a server would set the threshold
much higher to tolerate the potential burst of requests,
e,g., flash crowds on websites.
2.1 Legitimate User Model

Trust of a client is built up through his visiting
history, and used as the criteria in evaluating the
likelihood of the client being legitimate or not. Most
existing schemes use packet rate as the metric to
identify attackers. It is potential that intelligent attackers
can adjust their packet rate based on server's response to
evade detection [7]. In contrast, clients' visiting histories
are hard to be modified, because servers keep access
logs, and the data used in trust evaluation are secured
using cryptography. Hence using trust as the evaluation
criteria will be more reliable in application layer DDoS
attacks. The organization of this paper is as follows. In
Section 2, we discuss related work. We describe the
legitimate user model and attacker model in Section 3.
We then propose our TMH defense mechanism in
Section 4 and in Section 5, we simulate and analyze it.
Finally, we extend TMH to collaborative trust
management in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7. 2
Background and Related Work

1. Use traces of Internet accesses to build an initial
model density0(t), where t is a inter-arrival time and
density(t) is the probability a legitimate user will revisit
the service after t seconds. Many traces has been done
by researchers, e.g. F. Douglis et al. [5] traced web
users to investigate caching technique in World Wide
Web, and M. Arlitt et al. [1] presents a workload
characterization study for Internet Web servers. Six
different data sets are traced in this study: three from
academic (i.e., university) environments, two from
scientific research organizations, and one from a
commercial Internet provider.

Trust management has been well studied in
distributed systems to ensure the fairness in resource
sharing or to evaluate the reliability of a resource
provider. It has many potential applications in P2P
networks. Trust management often uses peers' records,
such as their upload and download data amount, or peer
reviews, to build up trust information [4, 16]. P2PRep

2. Rebuild user model densityi+1(t) with the newly
collected inter-arrival times of all legitimate users after
TMH runs d days under model densityi(t), where d is
randomly chosen from [dmin; dmax]. Note that we
build the new density distribution using the data of
legitimate users, whose requests are accepted by TMH.
It means that densityi+1(t) is tightly derived from

In contrast to attackers, legitimate users are people
who request services for their benefit from the content
of the services. Therefore, the inter-arrival time of
requests from a legitimate user would form a certain
density distribution density(t) [5]. With this insight, we
build the user model in the following way:
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densityi(t) and hence is di±cult to be fooled by
attackers. As a practical legitimate user model, it should
satisfy the following properties:

to implement, but they are also easier to be detected;
strategy 3 and 4 are more complicated as they consider
the server responses or modeling legitimate users.
Strategy 4 requires long-term preparation of attackers in
order to gain a high trust level. This strategy needs
attackers being more “patient". In session °ooding
attacks, attackers cannot spoof their IPs or change them
within a session, because a session is set up on TCP
connection which requires a three-way handshake.
Since attackers cannot hide themselves through
modifying IPs, they would prefer using strategy 3 and 4
to mimic behavior of legitimate users, to evade
detection. We will simulate each strategy in Section 5.

firstly, it should converge fast to the users' accesses
interval distribution;
secondly, it should be dynamic as the distribution may
change from time to time;
and most importantly, it should be lightweight to be
easily implemented and monitored in the defense
mechanism. The user model we proposed in this section
can satisfy the first two requirements as the density
function is updated regularly; and it is lightweight as the
update to density distribution is incremental and it does
not try to capture the complicated reasons for the
changes rejected.

IV. MITIGATION BY TRUST MANAGEMENT
The following are the properties in designing our
mitigation mechanism:

In our implementation, we employ the traces
collected at AT&T Labs Research and Digital
Equipment Corporation by F. Douglis et al. [5] to build
density0(t). In this initial density distribution model,
there are a number of peaks in the user request arrival
intervals, with the most prominent ones corresponding
to intervals of one minute, one hour and one day. The
mean inter-arrival time was 25.4 hours with a median of
1.9 hours and a standard deviation of 49.6 hours.

(1) It should be deployed at the server for incentive and
performance reasons [14].
(2) It should be lightweight, to reduce the processing
delay and to avoid being a new target of attacks.
(3) It should be easy to deploy and independent to the
details of servers. The defense mechanism need not
know what services the server runs or what
conguration it uses.

III. ATTACKER MODEL

(4) It should be adaptive to the server's resource
consumption and differentiate between concurrent
requests.

The goal of session flooding DDoS attack is to
keep the number of simultaneous session connections of
the server as large as possible to stop new connection
requests from legitimate users being accepted.
Therefore, an attacker may consider using the following
strategies when he controls a lot of zombie machines or
can misuse P2P network as an attack platform as
introduced in section 2:

To evaluate the visiting history of clients2
effectively, we use trust. The client who behaves better
in history will obtain higher degree of trust. Here we
define several components of it before defining trust.
Definition 1 Short-term trust Ts, estimating the
recent behavior of a client. It is used to identify those
clients who send session connection requests at a high
rate when the server is under session flooding attacks.

1.

Send session connection requests at a fixed rate,
without considering the response or the service
ability of victim.

2.

Send session connection requests at a random rate,
without considering the response or the service
ability of victim.

Definition 2 Long-term trust Tl, estimating the
long-term behavior of a client. It is used to distinguish
clients with normal visiting history and those with
abnormal visiting history.

3.

Send session connection requests at a random rate
and consider the response or the service ability of
victim by adjusting request rate according to the
proportion of accepted session connection requests
by the server.

Definition 3 Negative trust Tn, cumulating the
distrust to a client, each time the client's overall trust
falls below the initial value T0. It is used to penalize a
client if he is less trustworthy than a new client.

4.

First send session connection requests at a rate
similar to legitimate users to gain trust from server,
then start attacking with one of the above attacking
strategies.

Definition 4 Misusing trust Tm, cumulating the
suspicious behavior of a client who misuses its
cumulated reputation. It is used to prevent vibrational
attacks by repeatedly cheating for high trust.
Definition 5 Trust T, representing the overall
trustworthiness of a client, which takes into account all

The tradeoff of these strategies is between cost and
ability to avoid the detection. Strategy 1 and 2 are easy
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of his short-term trust, long-term trust, negative trust
and misusing trust.

A license serves two functionality: for user
identification and trust computation. The identification
information, such as ID and IP, must be stored at the
client license. The state variables for trust computation
can be stored at the client or at the server. Each has its
advantages and drawbacks. Keeping licenses at a server
largely prevents attackers from tempering them, but it is
a single point of data failure. Issuing licenses to users
distributes the storage, making TMH more scalable in
supporting clients, but the server needs to verify the
authenticity of a license. It trades o® between a server's
storage and computation resources. We use client-based
license for distributing the data and better scalability.
The license can be dispensed to clients using cookies or
by additional application layer protocols. Client
provides his license whenever he requests a connection.
TMH verifies the license by first checking if the request
originates from the IP address included in the license3
and whether the last access time LT matches the server's
log, then validating if the hash H agrees with the hash
computed using the license and the server password SP.
Connection request without a license will be treated as
from new users and a new license will be issued if TMH
decides to accept it. Note that an attacker can not
change its IP address during a single session since a
session must be set up according a full-TCP connection
which needs three-handshake. Even in different
sessions, an attacker is only able to change its IP
address in a limited range, such as in a small network
segment; otherwise, ISPs can not route handshake
packets to the attacker.

To reduce the processing overhead brought by
TMH, a short-term blacklist should be implemented.
The blacklist records the list of clients whose trust
values are too low. When a client's trust T drops below
some threshold, he is recorded into the blacklist with an
expiration time.

Fig. 1 : The components of TMH and its
communication with other modules
He is then banned from accessing the server until his
blacklist record expires. The TMH mitigation
mechanism is deployed at the server. A session connec
tion request first reaches TMH and it checks whether
the client is blacklisted; if not, it computes the trust to
the client and use trust-based scheduling to schedule the
connection request for the server. The architecture of
TMH is shown in Fig.1. We will introduce the
components of it in the rest of this section.

Implementation We mainly consider the protection
of the most important application layer server on
Internet, i.e. web server, which is also the most
favourite target of known DDoS attacks. Cookies (RFC
2965, 2109) are small bits of textual information that a
web server sends to a browser and that the browser
returns unchanged when visiting the same web site or
domain later. They are widespread used for convenient
purposes, e.g. identifying a user during an e-commerce
session, avoiding username and password, customizing
a site, and soon. The default setting of most operation
systems and browsers allow cookies.Hence, we employ
them to keep the license information of the client. In our
implantation, we use Java Servlet Cookie API to
manage licenses. Table 1 shows the license set and get
functions in our implantation of TMH. These functions
are very lightweight and need little process power. Note
that although each cookie is limited to 4KB, it is enough
for us since each license needs only 544 bits.

4.1 License Management
Because of mobile technology, users can make
connections at different network segments. It is difficult
to identify mobile users with dynamic IPs. Users
connected from a proxy (e.g. HTTP proxy) are also
difficult to be identified. Therefore, one way to mitigate
session flooding attacks is to give priority in serving a
subset of the good users, who we can identify and trust.
The identification information and trust states can be
stored at clients and verified by the server. We call the
information stored at clients as license. It contains the
following:64-bit identifier ID, IP address of client IP,
the overall trust T to the client, negative trust Tn,
misusing trust Tm, last access time LT, average access
interval AT, the total number of accesses AN, and a
keyed hash H of the concatenation of all the above, with
a 128-bit server password SP as the key. SP is private to
the server. Note that we identify a client by his public IP
and the server assigned identifier. If IP address alone is
used, clients behind NATs cannot be distinguished,
because they share the same public IP address.
Including the identifier ID enables uniquely identifying
a client even if he is hidden behind NATs.

4.2 Adaptive Trust Computing
The computation of trust T’ employs T, Tn, Tm,
LT, AT and AN in license, current time now, and
usedRate (i.e., the percentage of connected sessions
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over MaxConnector) of the server. Based on
Assumption 2 in Section 3, usedRate << 1 normally. As
we explained, a server should give priority to protecting
the connectivity of good users during session flooding
attacks, instead of identifying all the attack requests.
Since a higher trust value means a request is more likely
to be accepted, it is desired to satisfy: Tlegitimate user >
Tnew client > Tattacker.

Using the short-term trust and long-term trust
computed above and the misusing trust provided in
license, we can then compute trust T’ as follows:

where β€ [0; 1] with default value 0.5, it decides
the weight of short-term trust and long term trust in the
overall trust computation.
Negative trust is used to penalize users that have
carried out attack, or carried out abnormal requests
during periods that the server is busy. It cumulates the
difference of trust T’ to the initial value T0 each time T’
is smaller than T0. The formula is as follows:

Misusing Trust prevents vibrational attacks that
repeatedly cheat for high trust by checking whether a
user's trust is decreasing. It cumulates the difference in
trust values if trust T’ is smaller than the last time. The
formula is as follows:

Short term trust is very important in distinguishing
attackers, as almost all DDoS attacks are carried out in a
relatively short period. For short-term trust, we consider
both the interval of latest two accesses of the client and
the current process ability of the server.
Considering two different session connection
requests with the same access interval at different
arrival time, for the client when it arrives the server is
relatively busy, it has a higher possibility to be an
attacker and thus the short-term trust of it will be
relatively lower. We give the formula of short-term trust
as follows:

where
(0; 1], which is a weight factor
deciding the degree of cumulation. It can be assigned by
servers according to their demands with default value 1.
Recall that in above four formulas, Tn and Tm are the
negative trust and misuse trust provided by the license
respectively. For a client accessing the server for the
first time, its initial value of the overall trust is 0.1, and
its initial value of negative trust and misusing trust are
both 0, i.e. T0 = 0:1, Tn0 = Tm0 = 0.
Computation overhead As can be seen from the
formulas, the computation in updating a trust value is
minimal. The major factor of computation overhead is
in generating the cryptographic hash of a license. Yet
each hash input is only 544 bits, and MD5 can compute
more than 120,000 such hashes per second ( measured
in software using Java 5.0 and a PC with 2.13GHz CPU
and 2GB memory). Even if using an of-the-shelf PC as
a server, the server is capable of verifying more licenses
than the normal network bandwidth can transmit.
Besides, servers usually have more computational
resources.

where α is a weight factor deciding the influence of
usedRate. It is a positive real number with default value
1 and can be modified by servers as needed. When α
0, the short-term trust mainly relies on the interval
of the latest two accesses of the client.
Long term trust is the most important factor when a
legitimate user builds up his credit. For long-term trust,
the negative trust, average access interval and the total
number of accesses should all be taken into account.
They can represent the long-term behavior of a client.
The formula of long-term trust is:

Special
Issue of International
Journal
of Computer
Science
& Informatics
(IJCSI),
ISSN
(PRINT)
: 2231–5292, Vol.Vol.- II,
International
Journal of
Computer
Science
& Informatics
(IJCSI),
ISSN
(PRINT)
: 2231–5292,
3, Issue-1,
Issue- 12

177
38

Mechanism to Mitigate Application Layer DDoS Attack with a Light Weight Trust approach

4.3 Trust-based Scheduler
When a session connection request reaches TMH, it
firstly validates the license the client provides. If
passed, it will compute the client's new overall trust,
negative trust and misusing trust and then update this
information into the license. Afterwards, the scheduler
in TMH decides whether to redirect it to the server
based on the trust values. TMH schedules session
connection requests once every time slot. If the total
number of the on-going sessions and the sessions
waiting to be connected is not larger than the
MaxConnector of the server, the scheduler will redirect
all requests to the server. Otherwise, suppose there are
N session connection requests waiting to be connected
and the percentage of requests should be dropped is µ,
We propose following the scheduling policies to drop
suspicious requests:
1.

2.

Foot-n: sort all requests in current time slot by the
clients' trusts in the decreasing order. For clients
that have the same overall trust, sort them by their
misusing trusts in the increasing order.We then
drop the last n =
N requests.
Probability-n: give each client i a probability pi

to denote the probability at which his session
connection request will be accepted. Thus we drop his
request with probability 1 - pi.
4.4 Possible Attacks
We discuss some possible attacks to TMH in this
subsection. Index reflection attack In Section 2, we
described the index reflection attack. The peers
manipulated into flooding session connection requests
are either new users to the server or behave as attackers
with strategy 4. During attack, TMH gives priority in
serving the known users with high trusts. As the
attacking peers frequently request for session
connections, the trust of them drops till they are
blacklisted. Thus they are penalized. License forgery,
replay and deletion attacks Clients might not follow the
protocol of TMH exactly, they might try to cheat about
the license, for example, forging a new one, sharing a
license, using an old license, or refuse to store a license.
As mentioned, the license is hashed with a server
password, thus, it is computationally infeasible for a
forgery to be valid. If attackers send random licenses to
make TMH verify, TMH risks exhausting its
computation power. However, the computation
performed by TMH is lightweight, it can verify as many
licenses in time as the network can transmit. And as the

license stores the IP address, sharing a license is only
possible for clients within the same subnet or NAT.
Furthermore, since the last access time is included in the
license, THM can detect if a client reuses an old license,
by cross-checking the last access information the server
logs, i.e. 64-bit identifer ID and last access time LT. If
an attacker discards his license of low trust to pretend to
be a new user, he will still be assigned lower priority
than the known users with high trusts. Additional efforts
can be made to distinguish a benign new user and an
apparent new user but who is actually a zombie attacker
having discarded his license. For example, TMH can
issue a request on the server's behalf, asking the new
users to send their connection requests to another IP
which is also under the server's control. If a user
responds to the request and redirects his connections
correctly, the user is not a zombie machine [19].
Graphical turing test [12] is another possible solution to
tell apart zombies from benign new users.
V. SIMULATION
We implement TMH as a package, which consists
of about 500 lines of Java source code. This package
can run separately and then redirect scheduled requests
to web servers or be integrated with other open source
web servers after slight modification, such as Tomcat or
JBoss. In this section, we present the simulation results
to analyze the performance of TMH against different
attack strategies and to compare the effect of different
scheduling policies.
5.1 Simulation Setup
The simulation is set up in a local area network
with 100Mbps links. We simulated 100 legitimate users,
varying number of attackers and a server protected by
TMH. Clients request the server for HTTP sessions. The
server directly responds to them if they pass the
verification and get scheduled by TMH. Constrained by
the server's memory and other resources, MaxConnector
is set to 1000. That is, the server can serve maximally
1000 concurrent sessions; beyond that, the session
requests will be dropped. In our simulation, legitimate
users follow the model described in Section 3.1, we set
dmin=15 and dmax=20; while attackers attack with
different strategies described in Section 3.2. The
lifetime of a session follows an exponential distribution
with mean equals to 20 seconds. TMH uses default
values of α, β, and in the computation of trust. It
issues license to new users with density(now - LT) and
density(AT) set to be 0.1. After it verifies a license and
updates the trust, it schedules the requests using the
policies described in Section 4.3. For comparison, we
also implemented two simple scheduling policies: (1)
Tail-n: drop the n = µ £ N requests that arrive last in a
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time slot. (2) Random-n: randomly drop n = µ £ N
requests in a time slot. A time slot is one second.
5.2 Results and Analysis
Fig.2 shows the change of overall trusts of
legitimate users and attackers. Its result is obtained
using Probability-n as the scheduling policy. For
Fig.2(a), there are 100 legitimate users and no attacker;
for Fig.2(b) to Fig.2(f), there are 500 attackers, besides
the 100 legitimate users. All the users and attackers are
started sequentially. In each simulation, the change of
overall trusts of each legitimate user is very similar to
each other. To illustrate this, we keep track of three
representative users, that is, users started at the
beginning, in the middle and at the end. Following the
same argument, we select three attackers based on the
starting sequence.

shows the trusts of legitimate users increase slower than
in Fig.2(a). That is due to the high used rate of server's
session connections under attacks. After 50 sessions, the
trusts of legitimate users are around 0.4. However, the
trusts of attackers decrease to around 0.01 in the first
few sessions due to their high request rate, and they
keep reducing slowly in the following sessions. For
Fig.2(c), attackers use strategy 2. They send session
connection requests with varying rate at one request in
every 5 to 10 seconds uniformly. The randomness in
attack rate causes the server to experience some burst of
session requests. This decreases the misusing trust of
legitimate users, which results in the fluctuation of their
trust values, as shown in the figure. After 50 sessions,
the trusts of the legitimate users are about 0.38.
VI. COLLABORATIVE TRUST MANAGEMENT
Many services are related but provided by different
servers, e.g., online auction and PayPal, or e-newspaper
and its advertisements. The related servers probably
share a large group of clients. For the common good or
economic incentives, TMHs deployed at these servers
can collaborate with one another by sharing trust
information of clients. We say these TMHs form a
collaboration group. The trust information shared is
particularly useful in distinguishing legitimate users.
The collaborating TMHs can take either or both actions
below:
1.

Exchange blacklist: a TMH exchanges its blacklist
(including client ID and its expiration time) with
other TMHs periodically. When a TMH receives a
blacklist, it merges the received blacklist into its
own.

2.

Exchange the trust values of clients: a TMH sends
its overall trust of clients to other TMHs
periodically. A client may visit the same server
multiple times within a period. Only the latest
overall trust logged by TMH is exchanged. When
client j requests a new session, TMH i uses
following formula to recompute the overall trust Tj
G of the client, which considers both the local trust
Tj computed by TMH i and the recommended trust
Tj r from other TMHs:

Fig. 2 : Global trusts over the number of sessions
Fig.2(a) plots the trusts of three selected users when
there is no attacker. All requests are accepted. It shows
that the trusts of legitimate users quickly increase from
0.1 to 0.3 in the first few sessions. After 50 sessions,
their trust values are over 0.5. For Fig.2(b), attackers
use strategy 1. They send session connection requests
with a fixed rate at one request per 5 seconds. Fig.2(b)

where I(i) is the collaboration group of TMH i, Cir
is the confidence level that TMH i has for the
recommended trust from TMH r, and
[0; 1] is the
confidence level of TMH i itself, 1 means the most
confident and 0 the least.
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The collaboration of TMHs can reduce the false
negatives of a single TMH and accelerate the
identification of attackers.
VII. CONCLUSION
To defend against application DDoS attacks is a
pressing problem of the Internet. Motivated by the fact
that it is more important for service provider to
accommodate good users when there is a scarcity in
resources, we present a lightweight mechanism TMH to
mitigate session flooding attack using trust evaluated
from users' visiting history. We verify its effectiveness
with simulations under different attack strategies.
Comparing to other defense mechanism, TMH is
lightweight, independent to the service details, adaptive
to the server's resource consumption and extendable to
allow collaboration among servers. In future work we
will investigate how to apply TMH into real-world
applications and how to defend against their types of
application layer DDoS attacks, including request
flooding attack and asymmetric attack.
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